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Internet Privacy Enforcement After 
Net Neutrality 
Thomas B. Norton* 
 
In March 2015, the Federal Communications Commission reclassi-
fied broadband Internet access service providers as “common carriers” 
subject to obligations under Title II of the Communications Act. One 
such obligation is to comply with the Act’s section 222 privacy provi-
sions. As a result of reclassification, the Federal Communications 
Commission claims privacy enforcement jurisdiction over a broad swath 
of companies that formerly fell within the Federal Trade Commission’s 
regulatory reach. The Federal Trade Commission and industry players 
have been outwardly critical of this effect. This Note explores the result-
ing tension between the two agencies and proposes potential resolutions 
for it. 
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INTRODUCTION: THE FCC’S OPEN INTERNET ORDER HAS 
CAUSED INTERAGENCY TENSION OVER INTERNET PRIVACY 
ENFORCEMENT 
In March 2015, the Federal Communications Commission 
(“FCC”) released its Open Internet Order (the “Order”), which 
established new net neutrality rules applicable to broadband Inter-
net access service providers.1 These rules, which will apply to both 
fixed and mobile broadband providers, have multiple effects. 
Among others, the rules prohibit blocking, throttling, and paid pri-
oritization of broadband Internet services.2 The rules also require 
heightened transparency from broadband service providers and 
dictate their future conduct.3 But most significantly for this Note, 
the rules reclassify broadband Internet access service as a tele-
communications service under Title II of the Communications 
Act.4 
In the Order, the FCC elected to forbear from applying some 
provisions of Title II to newly reclassified broadband Internet ser-
vices providers.5 But with respect to certain of the Title’s other 
provisions, the FCC elected not to forbear application. One of these 
provisions is section 222 of Title II of the Communications Act, 
which governs the privacy of data known as Customer Proprietary 
Network Information (“CPNI”).6 The FCC’s election to not for-
bear from applying this section means that newly reclassified 
broadband Internet service providers are subject to the same priva-
cy obligations as those imposed upon telephone service providers.7 
By extending section 222 to cover broadband Internet service pro-
viders this way, the FCC’s rule supplants the Federal Trade 
Commission’s (“FTC”) authority to regulate those companies, 
                                                                                                                            
1 See In re Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, Report and Order on Remand, 
Declaratory Ruling, and Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601 (2015) [hereinafter 2015 Open Internet 
Order]. 
2 See id. paras. 110–32. 
3 See id. para. 109. 
4 See id. paras. 306–87. 
5 See id. paras. 434–60. 
6 See id. paras. 462–67; see also infra notes 31–33 and accompanying text. 
7 See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, para. 462. 
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because the FTC lacks jurisdiction over telecommunications ser-
vice providers.8 
Because of this, some FTC representatives have spoken out in 
opposition of reclassification.9 Other privacy advocates, on the 
other hand, view reclassification and section 222 forbearance as a 
victory for consumer privacy.10 Nevertheless, the FCC’s action has 
created an interagency tension that raises many interesting ques-
tions. First, what does the Order say about privacy, and how does 
this alter the FCC and FTC’s respective privacy enforcement au-
thority? What effect do the Order’s mandates have on the FTC 
and FCC’s ability to adequately address those privacy concerns 
that each is charged with policing? What explains the perceived 
interagency tension to which the FCC’s action gives rise? And fi-
nally, what might be done to resolve that tension? I address these 
questions in the remainder of this Note. 
I proceed in four Parts. In Part I, I recount the pre-Open Inter-
net Order online privacy landscape. I will describe both the FTC 
and FCC’s privacy enforcement authority and summarize recent 
privacy enforcement actions taken by each agency. 
In Part II, I discuss the Order’s approach for regulating online 
privacy. I will note the ways in which the Order addresses or fails to 
address a shifting online privacy enforcement regime. 
In Part III, I outline how the Order’s language drastically alters 
the online privacy landscape. First, I describe how the FCC’s elec-
tion to not forbear from applying section 222 privacy obligations to 
broadband Internet service providers dramatically expands those 
providers’ privacy obligations. I also explain how these broad new 
obligations expose those providers to increased risk of enforce-
ment. Finally, I devote substantial discussion to jurisdictional chal-
lenges that result from reclassification. This discussion focuses 
mainly on the FTC’s discontent with the effect of reclassification 
of broadband Internet service providers as Title II “common carri-
                                                                                                                            
8 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 44, 45(a)(2) (2012). Because broadband Internet services have 
hitherto not been offered on a common carrier basis, the FTC has exercised jurisdiction 
over those services. Id.; see also FTC v. Verity Int’l, Ltd., 443 F.3d 48, 58–60 (2d Cir. 
2006). 
9 See infra Part III.C.2. 
10 See infra Part III.C.2. 
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ers” on its privacy enforcement authority, as well as on possible 
explanations for this response. 
In Part IV, I analyze possibilities for resolving the jurisdictional 
challenges that reclassification raises. These possibilities include 
the FCC’s promulgating FTC-like privacy rules, Congress’ repeal-
ing the Federal Trade Act’s common carrier exception, and an 
FCC/FTC co-governance regime. 
I. THE PRE-OPEN INTERNET ORDER PRIVACY 
ENFORCEMENT LANDSCAPE 
As consumers grow more interested in the privacy of their per-
sonal information, so grow efforts to regulate privacy online. While 
many are familiar with the FTC’s role as a privacy and security en-
forcer, the FCC very recently adopted an aggressive approach to 
broadening its authority to enforce privacy against the entities it 
regulates. In this Part, I frame both agencies’ authority and ap-
proach to privacy enforcement. 
A. FTC Privacy Enforcement 
The FTC is the agency charged with protecting consumers and 
their privacy.11 As part of its privacy efforts, the FCC conducts 
studies and issues reports, hosts public workshops, develops educa-
tional materials for both consumers and industry, and influences 
privacy-related legislation and regulation.12 The FTC has authority 
to enforce a variety of sectoral privacy laws, such as the Children’s 
Online Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”) and the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act (“GLB”).13 In addition, the FTC offers an “en-
                                                                                                                            
11 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, 2014 PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY UPDATE 1 (2015), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/privacy-data-security-update-
2014/privacydatasecurityupdate_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/H9FF-UV99] [hereinafter 
2014 PRIVACY AND SECURITY UPDATE]. 
12 See id. 
13 Id. COPPA requires websites and apps to obtain parental consent before collecting 
personal information from users who are under the age of thirteen. See Children’s Online 
Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6502 (2000). The FTC has brought 
over twenty COPPA cases and has revised the COPPA rule to meet developments in 
social networking, Internet access on smartphones, and geolocation tracking that 
implicate children’s privacy. 2014 PRIVACY AND SECURITY UPDATE, supra note 11, at 7. 
The GLB Act requires financial institutions to send consumers annual privacy notices and 
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forcement backstop” for the Safe Harbor Agreement through 
which United States companies transfer customer data to and from 
the European Union in a manner consistent with European Union 
law.14 
But recently, the primary thrust of the FTC’s consumer pro-
tection authority has come from section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act (“FTC Act”), which prohibits unfair or decep-
tive market practices.15 Through investigation and subsequent en-
forcement action, the FTC addresses consumer protection viola-
tions by ordering companies to remedy unlawful behavior.16 Such 
orders typically require that malfeasant companies take specific 
remedial steps, including that they implement comprehensive pri-
vacy and data security programs, delete unlawfully-obtained con-
sumer information, provide adequate notice and choice about pri-
vacy practices, and other measures.17 The FTC has brought en-
forcement actions against, and has entered into settlements with, 
many companies, including well-known companies such as Google, 
Facebook, Twitter, and Microsoft.18 
                                                                                                                            
provide the opportunity to opt out of having their information shared with certain third 
parties. Id. The FTC has brought nearly thirty cases against GLB Act violators, including 
three in 2014. See id. at 6. 
14 See 2014 PRIVACY AND SECURITY UPDATE, supra note 11, at 6–7. On October 6, 2015, 
the Court of Justice of the European Union declared the safe harbor framework invalid as 
a means to legitimize transfers of personal data between the EU and the United States. 
See Case C-362-14, Schrems v. Data Protection Comm’r (Oct. 6, 2015), http://curia. 
europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=169195&doclang=en 
[http://perma.cc/JAJ8-K5XC]. 
15 See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012) (declaring unfair methods of competition unlawful and 
delineating means for preventing them). In August 2015, the FTC issued a Statement of 
Enforcement Principles that “describes the underlying antitrust principles that guide the 
[FTC’s] application of its statutory authority to take action against unfair methods of 
competition prohibited by [s]ection 5 of the FTC Act.” Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Issues 
Statement of Principles Regarding Enforcement of FTC Act as a Competition Statute, FTC 
(Aug. 13, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/08/ftc-issues-
statement-principles-regarding-enforcement-ftc-act [https://perma.cc/4BUS-TGQV]; 
see also Fed. Trade Comm’n, Statement of Enforcement Principles Regarding “Unfair 
Methods of Competition” Under Section 5 of the FTC Act, FTC (Aug. 13, 2015), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/735201/150813section
5enforcement.pdf [https://perma.cc/R5CV-24HS]. 
16 See 2014 PRIVACY AND SECURITY UPDATE, supra note 11. 
17 Id. 
18 See id. 
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Several recent enforcement actions exemplify the FTC’s en-
forcement approach. In one, the FTC charged a company called 
Jerk, LLC (operating under the domain Jerk.com) for perpetuating 
an extortionary scheme that involved harvesting information from 
individuals’ Facebook profiles to fabricate false profiles labeling the 
individuals either as a “Jerk” or “not a Jerk.”19 After it created a 
profile, Jerk.com would then contact those individuals whose in-
formation appeared in the profile to advise them that they could 
revise those profiles by paying the company thirty dollars in 
“membership” fees.20 The FTC’s complaint alleged that Jerk.com 
misled its victims by claiming that the profiles had been created by 
other Jerk.com members and that by paying for a site membership 
they would have access to “premium” features.21 On March 25, 
2015, the FTC announced that in a five-to-zero vote, it granted 
summary decision against Jerk.com for these misleading practic-
es.22 
In In re Snapchat, Inc., another recent enforcement action, the 
photo-sharing app settled charges that it deceived consumers by 
promising that “snaps”—photos taken by one user and sent to 
another—would “disappear[ ] forever” after a sender-specified 
time period expired.23 The FTC intervened because, in reality, 
photo recipients could save snaps indefinitely using relatively sim-
ple methods (such as by taking screenshots or installing third-party 
apps).24 Here, the FTC again voted five-to-zero to settle its charges 
                                                                                                                            
19 Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Charges Operators of “Jerk.com” Website With Deceiving 
Consumers, FTC (Apr. 7, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/ 
04/ftc-charges-operators-jerkcom-website-deceiving-consumers 
[https://perma.cc/939G-SZ6P]. See generally Complaint, In re Jerk, LLC, No. 122 3141 
(F.T.C. Apr. 2, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140407jerk 
part3cmpt.pdf [http://perma.cc/RGT8-WAEM] [hereinafter Jerk Complaint]. 
20 See Jerk Complaint, supra note 19, at 2. 
21 See id. at 5–6. 
22 Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Rules Jerk, LLC and John Fanning Deceived Consumers, 
Violated FTC Act, FTC (Mar. 25, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2015/03/ftc-rules-jerk-llc-john-fanning-deceived-consumers-violated-ftc 
[https://perma.cc/7XMB-M7EF]. 
23 Complaint at 1, 2–4, In re Snapchat, Inc., No. 132 3078 (F.T.C. Dec. 23, 2014), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140508snapchatcmpt.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/NM49-GQ64]. 
24 See id. at 3–4. 
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against Snapchat.25 The FTC noted that the settlement marked 
another example of the agency’s “ongoing effort to ensure that 
companies market their apps truthfully and keep their privacy 
promises to consumers.”26 
These are just a few examples—the FTC has brought over 115 
privacy and security-related enforcement actions over the past fif-
teen years.27 The FTC’s privacy jurisprudence is so robust that 
some contend that it amounts to the functional equivalent of a 
“common law of privacy.”28 Though there exists “hardly any judi-
cial opinions to show for it” (as most of the enforcement actions 
end in settlement), privacy law professionals and lawyers facing 
privacy issues “parse and analyze the FTC’s settlement agree-
ments, reports, and activities as if they were pronouncements by 
the Chairman of the Federal Reserve.”29 Accordingly, the FTC’s 
privacy-related activity is said to be “the broadest and most in-
fluential regulating force on information privacy in the United 
States.”30 
But the FTC is not the lone privacy sheriff. The FCC has the 
authority to enforce privacy violations against entities falling within 
its regulatory domain. 
B. FCC Privacy Enforcement 
Like the FTC, the FCC protects consumers’ privacy enforce-
ment. The FCC’s privacy enforcement authority comes from sec-
tion 222 of the Communications Act,31 which requires that tele-
communications carriers “protect the confidentiality of [custom-
                                                                                                                            
25 Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Approves Final Order Settling Charges Against Snapchat, 
FTC (Dec. 31, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/12/ftc-
approves-final-order-settling-charges-against-snapchat [https://perma.cc/DTB6-
AWAK]. 
26 Id. 
27 See Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Privacy Harms and the Effectiveness of the Notice and 
Choice Framework, I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y (2014), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/ 
students/groups/is/files/2015/01/Privacy-Harms-and-Notice-and-Choice-01-12-2015-1-
4.pdf [http://perma.cc/6YDC-LZZT]. 
28 See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law 
of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 583 (2014). 
29 Id. at 585. 
30 Id. at 587. 
31 47 U.S.C. § 222 (2008). 
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ers’] proprietary information” and ensure that it is not disclosed to 
third parties without consumers’ consent.32 The Communications 
Act defines “customer proprietary network information” 
(“CPNI”) as that information related to customers’ use of a tele-
communications service and the customers’ billing information as 
it relates to that service.33 CPNI includes details about customers’ 
calls, including duration, frequency, time, and number dialed.34 It 
does not include “subscriber list information” such as name, ad-
dress, and phone number.35 
The core privacy requirement for telecommunications carriers 
is contained in section 222(c), which sets forth the confidentiality 
protections that apply to CPNI.36 Per this provision, a carrier may 
only use, disclose, or permit access to customers’ individually iden-
tifiable CPNI in limited circumstances: (1) as required by law; (2) 
with the customer’s approval; or (3) as part of its provision of the 
telecommunications service from which such information is de-
rived, or as part of services necessary to or used in the provision of 
such telecommunications service.37 Exceptions to the confidentiali-
                                                                                                                            
32 See id. § 222(a). 
33 See id. § 222(h)(1) (defining “customer proprietary network information” as “(A) 
information that relates to the quantity, technical configuration, type, destination, 
location, and amount of use of a telecommunications service subscribed to by any 
customer of a telecommunications carrier, and that is made available to the carrier by the 
customer solely by virtue of the carrier-customer relationship; and (B) information 
contained in the bills pertaining to telephone exchange service or telephone toll service 
received by a customer of a carrier”). 
34 See id. 
35 See id. 
36 See id. § 222(c)(1) (“Except as required by law or with the approval of the customer, 
a telecommunications carrier that receives or obtains customer proprietary network 
information by virtue of its provision of a telecommunications service shall only use, 
disclose, or permit access to individually identifiable customer proprietary network 
information in its provision of (A) the telecommunications service from which such 
information is derived, or (B) services necessary to, or used in, the provision of such 
telecommunications service, including the publishing of directories.”). Section 222(a) 
imposes a general duty on telecommunications carriers to protect the confidentiality of 
proprietary information relating to other carriers, equipment manufacturers, and 
customers. See id. § 222(a). Section 222(b) provides that a carrier receiving or obtaining 
proprietary information from other carriers for the purpose of providing a 
telecommunications service is restricted to use such information only for that purpose; 
the provision further provides that a carrier may not use that information for its own 
marketing efforts. See id. § 222(b). 
37 See id. § 222(c). 
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ty provisions permit carriers to use, disclose, or permit access to 
customer proprietary network information in other limited cir-
cumstances, including: (1) to initiate, provide, bill for, and collect 
payment for telecommunications services; (2) to protect the rights 
or property of the carrier, its customers, and other carriers from 
improper use of those services; (3) to provide inbound telemarket-
ing, referral, or administrative services to customers; and (4) to 
provide a customer’s call location information in cases of emergen-
cy.38 
In October 2014, the FCC took a “significant step”39 toward 
protecting the privacy of information that falls beyond the tradi-
tional scope of CPNI.40 In In re TerraCom, Inc., the FCC held that 
the Communications Act’s privacy protections extend to “all types 
of information that should not be exposed widely to the public, 
whether because that information is sensitive for economic reasons 
or for reasons of personal privacy.”41 Though the FCC did not pre-
cisely define those data types included within the scope of “per-
sonal privacy” protection, it found “informative” the National In-
stitute of Standards and Technology’s (“NIST”) definition of 
“personally identifiable information.”42 
                                                                                                                            
38 See id. § 222(d). 
39 Alex Stout, FCC Imposes Record Penalty for Data Breach, LATHAM & WATKINS: 
GLOBAL PRIVACY & SEC. COMPLIANCE L. BLOG (Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.globalprivacy 
blog.com/privacy/fcc-imposes-record-penalty-for-data-breach/ [http://perma.cc/F479-
7CEM]. 
40 See generally In re TerraCom, Inc., Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, 29 
FCC Rcd. 13325 (2014) [hereinafter TerraCom Notice of Apparent Liability for 
Forfeiture] (determining that TerraCom, Inc. and YourTel America, Inc. have apparently 
willfully and repeatedly violated sections 222(a) and 201(b) of the Communications Act 
of 1934). 
41 Id. para. 14. 
42 See id. para. 17. NIST defines “personally identifiable information” as: 
[A]ny information about an individual maintained by an agency, 
including (1) any information that can be used to distinguish or trace 
an individual’s identity, such as name, social security number, date 
and place of birth, mother’s maiden name, or biometric records; and 
(2) any other information that is linked or linkable to an individual, 
such as medical, educational, financial, and employment information. 
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, GUIDE TO PROTECTING THE 
CONFIDENTIALITY OF PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION (PII) 2-1 (2010), 
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-122/sp800-122.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/T5RS-YN3X] (quoting U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-
2015] INTERNET PRIVACY ENFORCEMENT 235 
 
In the case, TerraCom and YourTel—companies that offered 
telephone services to low-income Americans through the FCC’s 
Lifeline program43—faced investigation for their treatment of per-
sonal information that they collected from individuals to determine 
those individuals’ eligibility to participate in the Lifeline pro-
gram.44 Discovery revealed that the companies left collected in-
formation, which included Social Security numbers and evidence 
of participation in other government assistance programs, unen-
crypted in the form of readable text accessible on the Internet.45 
This prompted the FCC’s investigation. 
In finding culpability, the FCC first noted that regulated enti-
ties have a duty to protect their customers’ general “proprietary 
information”—not only their specific CPNI information.46 The 
FCC determined that TerraCom and YourTel had breached that 
duty.47 In addition to relying on section 222, the FCC cited section 
201(b)’s requirement that regulated entities engage in “just and 
reasonable” conduct and determined that TerraCom and Your-
Tel’s failure to use “even the most basic and readily available 
technologies and security features,” and the companies’ failure to 
notify affected customers that their data had been breached, were 
neither just nor unreasonable.48 
                                                                                                                            
08-0536, PRIVACY: ALTERNATIVES EXIST FOR ENHANCING PROTECTION OF PERSONALLY 
IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION (2008), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08536.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/8UQL-PKUM]). 
43 The Lifeline program is a “retail voice telephony service that telecommunications 
carriers provide to qualifying low-income consumers for a reduced charge.” TerraCom 
Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, supra note 40, at 1 n.1 (citing 47 C.F.R. 
§ 54.407(b) (2015)); see also 47 C.F.R. §§ 54.400–.422; Lifeline and Link Up Reform and 
Modernization, 27 F.C.C. Rcd. 6656, paras. 11–18 (2012). 
44 See TerraCom Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, supra note 40, para. 2. 
45 See id. paras. 4–5. 
46 See id. para. 14–15 (noting that “[s]ection 222(a) of the Communications Act 
imposes a duty on every telecommunications carrier to protect the confidentiality of 
[customers’] ‘proprietary information,’” that “Congress used the term ‘proprietary 
information’ broadly to encompass all types of information that should not be exposed 
widely to the public,” and that “[h]ad Congress wanted to limit the protections of 
subsection (a) to CPNI, it could have done so”). 
47 See id. para. 30 (explaining that the companies’ failure to “employ[ ] appropriate 
security measures” to protect their customers’ information amounted to a breach of the 
duty imposed by section 222(a)). 
48 See id. para. 12. 
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By a three-to-two vote, the FCC fined the two companies $10 
million.49 The case marks the first time that the agency wielded its 
enforcement authority to police data security practices, and accord-
ing to Enforcement Bureau Chief Travis LeBlanc, it “will not be 
the last.”50 
The FCC followed the aggressive approach it took in TerraCom 
when it took enforcement action against AT&T. In In re AT&T 
Services, Inc.,51 the FCC investigated whether the company failed to 
properly protect customers’ confidential information.52 In that 
case, third-party vendors in Mexico, Colombia, and the Philippines 
handled customer service calls.53 The third-party representatives in 
these locations had access to customers’ sensitive personal infor-
mation, including names and at least the last four digits of Social 
Security numbers.54 
Third-party representatives in Mexico used their login creden-
tials to access the customer information.55 The representatives 
then used the accessed customer data to unlock stolen AT&T 
handsets via online request forms.56 In total, the Mexican em-
ployees made more than 290,000 unlock requests using data from 
more than 50,000 customers.57 Similarly, representatives in Co-
lombia and the Philippines accessed the data of approximately 
211,000 customers.58 
                                                                                                                            
49 See id. para. 55; see also Fed. Comm. Comm’n, FCC Plans $10 Million Fine for 
Carriers that Breached Consumer Privacy, FCC (Oct. 24, 2014), https://apps.fcc.gov/ 
edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-330136A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/JN54-ASPD]. 
50 See Brian Fung, With a $10 Million Fine, the FCC Is Leaping into Data Security for the 
First Time, WASH. POST (Oct. 24, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the- 
switch/wp/2014/10/24/with-a-10-million-fine-the-fcc-is-leaping-into-data-security-for-
the-first-time/ [http://perma.cc/5GWF-32H2]. 
51 In re AT&T Servs., Inc., Order and Consent Decree, 30 FCC Rcd. 2808 (2015) 
[hereinafter AT&T Order and Consent Decree]. 
52 See id. para. 1. 
53 See id. 
54 See id. 
55 See id. para. 7. 
56 See id. 
57 See id. para. 8. 
58 See id. para. 11. 
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As in TerraCom, no CPNI was compromised in the AT&T in-
cident.59 But here again, the FCC based its investigation and en-
forcement action on the disclosure of “personal information.”60 
AT&T consented to pay a record $25 million civil penalty and 
agreed to implement mandatory privacy-related compliance and 
monitoring procedures.61 
TerraCom and AT&T represent an FCC trend to take enforce-
ment actions to protect consumers’ privacy and data security. In 
total, the FCC has taken five such major enforcement actions and 
imposed fines valued at over $50 million in the past year.62 In May 
2014, the FCC announced that it planned to fine Dialing Savings, 
LLC $2.9 million for violating rules that protect consumers from 
receiving harassing, intrusive, or unwanted robo-calls on their mo-
bile devices.63 In the same month, the FCC entered into a $7.5 mil-
lion settlement agreement with Sprint to resolve an investigation 
into the company’s failure to honor consumers’ do-not call or do-
not-text requests.64 And in September 2014, the FCC reached a 
$7.4 million settlement agreement with Verizon to address allega-
tions that the company marketed to two million customers without 
receiving their consent or notifying them of their privacy rights.65 
In these recent enforcement actions, the FCC has carved out 
for itself a major consumer protection role by policing privacy vi-
olations. Though the FTC is the agency that usually comes to mind 
when one thinks of privacy and data security enforcement, the 
FCC’s recent enforcement actions demonstrate the agency’s wil-
lingness to scrutinize the privacy and security practices of compa-
                                                                                                                            
59 See id. paras. 8, 11. 
60 Id. paras. 1–2. 
61 See id. para. 24. 
62 See Fed. Comm. Comm’n, AT&T to Pay $25 Million to Settle Consumer Privacy 
Investigation: FCC’s Largest Data Security Enforcement Action, FCC (Apr. 8, 2015), 
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-332911A1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q489-PLWW]. 
63 See In re Dialing Services, LLC, Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, 29 FCC 
Rcd. 5537 (2014). 
64 See In re Sprint Corporation f/k/a Spring Nextel Corporation, Order, 29 FCC Rcd. 
4759 (2014). 
65 See In re Verizon Compliance with the Commission’s Rules and Regulations 
Governing Customer Proprietary Network Information, Adopting Order, 29 FCC Rcd. 
10303 (2014). 
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nies that fall within its jurisdiction. Though telecommunications 
companies are “accustomed to the high standards required for pro-
tecting CPNI,” the FCC’s aggressive approach in recent privacy 
and security enforcement decisions may have a transformative ef-
fect on all regulated entities, including the recently reclassified 
broadband Internet access service providers.66 
II. THE FCC’S POST-NET NEUTRALITY APPROACH TO 
INTERNET PRIVACY 
The FCC in its Open Internet Order continues this aggressive 
approach and as a result drastically alters the online privacy en-
forcement landscape. This Part dissects the Order’s language ad-
dressing privacy, analyzes what the order neglects to say about pri-
vacy, and details these statements and omissions’ overall effect on 
the Internet privacy enforcement landscape. 
A. How Does the Order Address Privacy Enforcement? 
In the Order, the FCC elects to not forbear from applying sec-
tion 222’s privacy protections to newly reclassified broadband In-
ternet access service providers.67 There, the FCC remarks that it 
“take[s] . . . seriously” section 222’s mandate that every telecom-
munications carrier protect the confidentiality of its customers’ 
private information.68 The FCC points out that it “has long sup-
ported protecting the privacy of users of advanced services.”69 In a 
footnote, the Order notes that even “long before Congress enacted 
section 222,” the FCC “recognized the need for privacy require-
ments associated with the provision of advanced services” and had 
accordingly adopted appropriate privacy requirements.70 Against 
                                                                                                                            
66 See, e.g., Stout, supra note 39 (describing implications of an aggressive FCC privacy 
and security enforcement policy). 
67 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, para. 462. 
68 Id. para. 462 n.1381. 
69 Id. para. 463. 
70 Id. para. 463 n.1384 (quoting In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to 
the Internet Over Wireline Facilities et al., Report and Order and Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 20 FCC Rcd. 14853, para. 149 & n.447 (2005) [hereinafter Wireline 
Broadband Classification Order]). 
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this background, the Order asserts that retaining section 222 “thus 
is consistent with the [FCC’s] general policy approach.”71 
Additionally, the FCC justifies its decision to not forbear from 
applying section 222 on the ground that forbearance would “not 
[be] in the public interest,” as section 222 is “necessary for the 
protection of consumers.”72 The FCC emphasizes that 
“[c]onsumers’ privacy needs are no less important when consum-
ers communicate over and use broadband Internet access than 
when they rely on [telephone] services.”73 The FCC explains that 
because consumers rely on their broadband service providers as 
conduits for information exchange on the Internet, those providers 
are poised to obtain “vast amounts” of customers’ private infor-
mation.74 Without appropriate safeguards, the FCC argues, broad-
band providers could use or disclose such information in manners 
“at odds with . . . customers’ interests.”75 
According to the FCC, a lack of adequate privacy protections 
might cause consumers to be concerned about how broadband pro-
viders treat their private information.76 This concern, the FCC be-
lieves, would result in consumers’ refraining from making full use 
of broadband Internet access, which in turn would lower both de-
mand for and adoption of broadband services.77 Adequate privacy 
protections for customers’ personal information, on the other 
hand, would spur demand for services and encourage broadband 
investment and deployment consistent with the FCC’s goals.78 
                                                                                                                            
71 Id. para. 463. 
72 Id. In these statements, the FCC references Communication Act section 10, which 
requires the agency to “forbear from applying any regulation or provision of the 
Communications Act to telecommunications carriers or . . . services if the [FCC] 
determines that [certain conditions are met].” See 47 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2012). 
73 See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, para. 463 (citing Wireline Broadband 
Classification Order, supra note 70, para. 148). 
74 See id. 
75 Id. 
76 See id. para. 464. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. (quoting In re Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: 
Telecommunications Carriers’ Use of Customer Proprietary Network Information and 
Other Customer Information, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 22 FCC Rcd. 6927, para. 59 (2007)). 
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Before issuing the final Order, the FCC received and consi-
dered comments that opposed the application of section 222 to 
broadband Internet access service providers. In the Order, the 
FCC rejects these comments as being too general and lacking any 
“meaningful analysis” of how commenters’ concerns over applica-
tion of the section outweigh the FCC’s privacy concerns.79 Accor-
dingly, the FCC concludes that applying section 222 is in the pub-
lic interest.80 In similar fashion, the FCC rejects arguments that the 
Communications Act’s section 706—which requires the FCC to 
determine whether “advanced telecommunications capability . . . is 
being deployed to all Americans in a reasonable and timely fa-
shion”81—provides adequate privacy protections to warrant sec-
tion 222 forbearance.82 The FCC notes that though section 706 
would indeed apply even if the FCC had elected to forbear from 
applying section 222, the latter provides “a more certain founda-
tion” for regulating broadband providers’ privacy-implicating con-
duct.83 
Though the FCC elected to not forbear from applying section 
222 generally, it did elect to forbear from applying section 222’s 
existing CPNI rules to broadband providers, insofar as those rules 
would be triggered by reclassification.84 Because those rules are 
more applicable to “problems that historically arise regarding voice 
service,” the FCC elects to forbear from applying those rules 
“pending further proceedings” to devise Internet-specific rules.85 
                                                                                                                            
79 See id. 
80 Id. 
81 47 U.S.C. § 706(a) (1996). 
82 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, para. 465. For an analysis of how section 
706 might come into play despite reclassification, see Daniel T. Deacon, Common Carrier 
Essentialism and the Emerging Common Law of Internet Regulation, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 133 
(2015) (arguing that “the emergence of [s]ection 706 as a standalone basis for jurisdiction 
may push the FCC toward a more common-law, antitrust-like system of regulation than 
the command-and-control-style system with which it is historically most familiar”). 
83 See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, para. 465. 
84 Id. para. 467. 
85 Id. paras. 466–67. The Order leaves unclear when such proceedings might occur, or 
when the rules they spawn might take effect. On April 28, 2015, however, the FCC held a 
public workshop on consumer broadband privacy with the goals of “explor[ing] the 
[FCC’s] role in protecting the privacy of consumers that use broadband Internet access 
service,” “provid[ing] an opportunity for diverse stakeholders to explore a range of 
matters associate with the application of statutory privacy protections to broadband 
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B. What Does the Order Fail to Address? 
The Order lacks reference to the FTC’s traditional role as a 
privacy enforcer for online activity. Though the FCC describes 
how it has recently wielded its section 222 power to tackle privacy 
enforcement in TerraCom, it fails to draw a comparison or distinc-
tion between this power and the FTC’s section 5 enforcement 
power.86 The Order does not note how the reclassification of 
broadband Internet access service providers as common carriers 
affects the scope of the FTC’s enforcement power.87 Nor does the 
order address whether reclassification comes with any clear en-
forcement boundaries or limits for either agency.88 
III. THE FCC’S INTERNET PRIVACY APPROACH 
DRASTICALLY ALTERS THE INTERNET PRIVACY 
ENFORCEMENT LANDSCAPE 
By reclassifying broadband Internet access services as common 
carriers under Title II, the FCC alters the Internet privacy en-
forcement landscape. Applying section 222’s privacy protection 
framework to broadband Internet access service providers subjects 
them to stronger privacy obligations than those to which they are 
accustomed. In this vein, it may prove costly for reclassified enti-
ties to comply with these suddenly-imposed duties, and this in turn 
may increase the risk that the FCC may take enforcement action 
against them. Finally, reclassification gives rise to jurisdictional 
challenges, as reclassification has the effect of shielding a signifi-
cant group of business entities from the FTC’s enforcement au-
thority. 
                                                                                                                            
Internet access service,” and “address[ing] whether and to what extent the [FCC] can 
apply a harmonized privacy framework across various services within [its] jurisdiction.” 
See Public Workshop on Broadband Consumer Privacy, FCC (April 28, 2015, 10:00 AM), 
https://www.fcc.gov/events/wcb-and-cgb-public-workshop-broadband-consumer-
privacy [https://perma.cc/6QZA-HGTV] [hereinafter Public Workshop]. 
86 See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, para. 53 n.48; see also supra notes 31–48 
and accompanying text. 
87 See generally 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 1. 
88 See generally id. 
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A. Expanded Privacy Obligations 
In electing to not forbear from applying section 222 to broad-
band Internet service providers, the FCC expands that provision’s 
strong privacy obligations to those providers. On May 20, 2015, the 
FCC released an enforcement advisory to remind reclassified enti-
ties that the Order “applies the core customer privacy protections 
of [s]ection 222,” and that accordingly, they “shall only use, dis-
close, or permit access to individually identifiable customer pro-
prietary network information” in the provision of services.89 Con-
sequently, as of June 12, 2015 (the net neutrality rules’ effective 
date), broadband providers are obliged to comply with expanded 
requirements designed to more strongly protect consumer privacy 
and restrict customer data use.90 
The FCC’s enforcement advisory indicates that broadband In-
ternet service providers should anticipate that their privacy and 
data protection programs will be subject to the agency’s increased 
scrutiny.91 Indeed, the enforcement advisory instructs broadband 
providers to take appropriate steps to protect their customers’ pri-
vacy in accordance with section 222 until further rulemaking clari-
fies specifically how that section’s provisions will apply to broad-
band Internet access service providers.92 Until that rulemaking 
takes place, it is difficult to predict precisely how the agency will 
enforce those rules against providers.93 
                                                                                                                            
89 FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT ADVISORY NO. 2015-03, ENFORCEMENT 
BUREAU GUIDANCE: BROADBAND PROVIDERS SHOULD TAKE REASONABLE, GOOD FAITH 
STEPS TO PROTECT CONSUMER PRIVACY (2015), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/ 
attachmatch/DA-15-603A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/EM86-C2AN] [hereinafter 
ENFORCEMENT ADVISORY]; 47 U.S.C. § 222(c)(1) (2012). 
90 ENFORCEMENT ADVISORY, supra note 89; see 47 U.S.C. § 1302. 
91 See ENFORCEMENT ADVISORY, supra note 89. 
92 Id. at 2 (“[T]he [FCC’s] Enforcement Bureau intends to focus on whether 
broadband providers are taking reasonable, good-faith steps to comply with [s]ection 222, 
rather than focusing on technical details. . . . [B]roadband providers should employ 
effective privacy protections in line with their privacy policies and core tenets of basic 
privacy protections.”). 
93 See Michael Pryor, FCC Has New Privacy Requirements for Broadband Providers, 
LAW360 (Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/619408/fcc-has-new-privacy-
requirements-for-broadband-providers [http://perma.cc/F6CX-R3J5]. Pryor suggests 
that perhaps Internet-specific section 222 rules will simply adapt the types of data 
protected in the Internet context. For example, perhaps the adapted rule will replace 
protections for data about the number of calls a customer makes with protections for 
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B. Higher Privacy Burdens and Increased Enforcement Risk 
The necessity of complying with heightened privacy obligations 
increases the risk that broadband Internet access service providers 
will be the subject of FCC enforcement action. Before reclassifica-
tion, the FCC set forth on an aggressive privacy enforcement path 
in TerraCom and AT&T.94 In those cases, the FCC initiated en-
forcement actions based on claimed data breaches—which are not 
explicitly addressed by existing section 222 provisions95—and 
called on both section 222 and section 201(b) to support findings of 
culpability.96 The Order affirms the FCC’s plan to broadly con-
strue and aggressively police broadband Internet service providers’ 
extensive (yet undefined) privacy duties under those sections.97 
This has caused concern among entities who now must comply 
with those sections’ requirements. 
In a May 1, 2015 lawsuit challenging the Order filed by the 
American Cable Association and National Cable & Telecommuni-
cations Association, Internet service providers frequently refer to 
the extensive burden associated with complying with section 222.98 
                                                                                                                            
customers’ bandwidth data; similarly, perhaps the rules will protect data about customer 
website visits instead of customers’ call destinations. 
94 See infra Part III.B. See generally 47 U.S.C. § 222. 
95 See infra Part III.B. 
96 See, e.g., TerraCom Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, supra note 40, at 30; 
AT&T Order and Consent Decree, supra note 51, paras. 3–5. 
97 See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, para. 462 n.1381 and accompanying text. 
But see id. at 5985–6000 (dissenting Statement of Commissioner Michael O’Rielly) 
(questioning the propriety of the FCC’s aggressive approach). In public statements, FCC 
Enforcement Bureau Chief Travis LeBlanc has described his agency’s privacy 
enforcement plan as a broad and aggressive one. See, e.g., Joseph Jerome, Travis LeBlanc 
on the FCC’s New Privacy Role, FUTURE OF PRIVACY FORUM (Dec. 11, 2014), 
http://www.futureofprivacy.org/2014/12/11/travis-leblanc-on-the-fccs-new-privacy-
role/ [http://perma.cc/LC29-66FV]; Brendan Sasso, The FCC’s $365 Million Man, 
NAT’L J. (Apr. 26, 2015), http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/the-fcc-s-365-million-
dollar-man-20150426 [http://perma.cc/XU39-24VW]. 
98 See Petition of Am. Cable Ass’n and Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n for Stay 
Pending Judicial Review, Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, GN Docket 14-28 
(May 1, 2015), https://www.ncta.com/sites/prod/files/2015.05.01%20ACA_NCTA%20 
Motion%20for%20Stay.pdf [https://perma.cc/D52Y-GRCT] [hereinafter Petition for 
Stay] (“Petitioners’ members would face extensive burdens to comply with [s]ection 
222(c)(1), including the creation of processes to ensure that CPNI is not used in 
marketing without customer approval.”). The 184-page petition mentions CPNI 137 
times. 
244 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.[Vol. XXVI:225 
 
For example, Cox argues that applying existing CPNI rules to its 
broadband services will force the company to “evaluate its current 
processes for authenticating individuals who contact Cox via 
phone, online, or in retail locations to obtain [broadband Internet 
access service]-related customer data to determine whether it is 
protecting customer information using processes that specifically 
comply with the requirements of section 222.”99 Cox also argues 
that complying with section 222 will require the company to eva-
luate all of its contracts with vendors that interact with broadband 
Internet access service-related customer data to ensure that those 
contracts provide protections sufficient to satisfy section 222’s re-
quirements.100 Mediacom, which has more than one million broad-
band customers, similarly argues that compliance with section 222 
requires immediate action that risks “substantial” lost costs for the 
company.101 
Small cable companies fear that burdens will fall heavily on 
them. The lawsuit also includes declarations from some small op-
erators, many of whom face CPNI rules for the first time because 
they do not offer phone services.102 Their arguments tend to follow 
a similar template and often use identical wording.103 These state-
ments, such as the declaration of William D. Bauer, CEO of 
WinDBreak Cable (a company with ten employees—three of 
whom are involved with the company’s broadband Internet access 
service), focus on the “serious irreparable harms” the CPNI rules 
would have on the companies’ “strong personal relationships with 
their customers.”104 Small providers also complain about the im-
pending need to renegotiate contracts with partners in order to 
comply with section 222’s stricter privacy rules, as well as the 
technical burdens (such as upgrading computer systems) asso-
                                                                                                                            
99 Declaration of Jennifer W. Hightower para. 7, in Petition for Stay, supra note 98. 
100 See id. 
101 Declaration of Thomas J. Larson para. 7, in Petition for Stay, supra note 98 
(“Mediacom will have no choice but to implement new procedures to comply with 
[s]ection 222, including updating operating manuals, implementing necessary technical or 
software updates, and training its customer support staff. The substantial costs involved 
in taking these potentially unneeded steps cannot be recouped if the Order’s 
reclassification is vacated.”). 
102 See generally Petition for Stay, supra note 98. 
103 See id. 
104 Declaration of William D. Bauer para. 8, in Petition for Stay, supra note 98. 
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ciated with compliance.105 Bagley Utilities argues that it, for exam-
ple, “may have to renegotiate its contracts with [Momentum Tele-
com, a contractor that activates Bagley’s customers’ service and 
monitors Bagley’s network for outages,] to ensure that CPNI is 
never used for marketing or sales purposes, and to ensure that 
Momentum Telecom takes necessary precautions to ensure the 
confidentiality of CPNI.”106 
Bagley, like others, further notes that if customer service suf-
fers while companies’ compliance processes are being upgraded, 
the companies will never be able to recover the lost customer 
goodwill.107 The small providers express fear that “[a]ny misjudg-
ment by [the companies] about the statute’s requirements could 
have catastrophic consequences,” including the possibility that the 
FCC might “impose large penalties—sometimes millions of dol-
lars—for violations of [the] CPNI rules.”108 
So far, the FCC has yet to address the new privacy scheme’s 
impact on small businesses; nevertheless, there remains the possi-
bility that the FCC will take these companies’ concerns into ac-
count when it reformulates broadband-specific CPNI in future 
rulemaking proceedings. 
C. Jurisdictional Challenges 
The FCC’s decision to reclassify broadband Internet service 
providers as common carriers creates jurisdictional challenges. Be-
fore reclassification, the FTC could wield its section 5 enforcement 
authority to police broadband Internet service providers’ privacy 
practices.109 But as a result of reclassification, the FTC’s power to 
                                                                                                                            
105 Id. para. 14. 
106 Declaration of Michael Jensen para. 14, in Petition for Stay, supra note 98. 
107 Id. para. 18. 
108 Declaration of William D. Bauer para. 25, in Petition for Stay, supra note 98. 
109 See supra Part I.A. Under sections 5(a) and 13(b) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a) 
& 53(b), “the FTC may proceed against unfair practices even if those practices [also] 
violate some other statute . . . .” FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1195 (10th Cir. 
2009) (referring to a provision of the Telecommunications Act); see also FTC v. T-Mobile 
USA, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-00967 (W.D. Wa. July 1, 2014) (exemplifying action against 
common carrier for deceptive and unfair practices in violation of the FTC Act resulting 
from T-Mobile’s placing third-party charges on telephone bills); FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY COMPETITION POLICY 38–41 (2007), https://www.ftc.gov/ 
sites/default/files/documents/reports/broadband-connectivity-competition-
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bring privacy enforcement actions against broadband providers is 
significantly reduced, as the FTC Act’s common carrier exemption 
bars the FTC from policing so-classified entities when they engage 
in common carriage services.110 Representatives from the FTC 
have spoken out against reclassification because of this effect.111 
Accordingly, there is a need for courts, Congress, or the agencies 
themselves to determine whether and how privacy enforcement 
responsibilities should be assigned. 
1. The Common Carrier Exception 
Per the FTC Act, the FTC lacks authority over “common car-
riers.”112 Under the Act, the FTC is empowered to wield its au-
thority to prevent commercial entities, “except [for] . . . banks . . . 
common carriers . . . air carriers . . . [and others] . . . from using un-
fair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”113 
Courts have long recognized that the FTC Act’s exceptions are 
“binding and unalterable.”114 As far back as 1920, the court in T.C. 
Hurst & Son v. FTC115 described the FTC’s lack of authority to re-
gulate common carriers under the FTC Act.116 In Hurst, the court 
reviewed the express language of the Act and concluded that 
“[b]anks and common carriers [are] doubtless excepted from the 
act.”117 In 1962, the Supreme Court affirmed this conclusion in the 
antitrust case United States v. Philadelphia National Bank,.118 and 
                                                                                                                            
policy/v070000report.pdf [https://perma.cc/BWY4-3BP4] [hereinafter BROADBAND 
CONNECTIVITY COMPETITION POLICY] (analyzing the application of section 5 of the FTC 
Act to broadband services). 
110 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2006). 
111 BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY COMPETITION POLICY, supra note 109, at 41. 
112 38 Stat. 717, §§ 5–6 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a)(2), 46(a), 
46(b) (1994 & Supp. 1998)). 
113 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2). 
114 Harold Furchtgott-Roth & Bryan Tramont, Commission on the Verge of a 
Jurisdictional Breakdown: The FCC and Its Quest to Regulate Advertising, 8 COMMLAW 
CONSPECTUS 219, 223 (2000). 
115 268 F. 874 (E.D. Va. 1920). 
116 See id. 
117 Id. at 877. 
118 374 U.S. 321 (1962). 
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held that the FTC’s authority is limited by the FTC Act’s excep-
tions.119 
Cases specifically involving common carriers similarly confirm 
the FTC’s lack of enforcement authority over them. For example, 
in FTC v. Miller,120 the court held that the FTC lacked authority to 
enforce a subpoena against a common carrier due to the statutory 
exception.121 In that case, the FTC attempted to investigate wheth-
er an interstate motor home carrier engaged in unlawful advertising 
practices, and as part of the investigation, the FTC subpoenaed 
some of the company’s records.122 The company cited the common 
carrier exception as a defense to oppose the subpoenas, and the 
FTC sought enforcement in district court.123 In overturning a dis-
trict court ruling, the Sixth Circuit cited the common carrier ex-
emption and dismissed the FTC’s argument that advertising by 
common carriers is a non-common carrier activity falling within 
FTC control.124 In so holding, the court confirmed that the com-
mon carrier exception is one of a number of “carve outs” in FTC 
authority.125 
2. FTC Has Been Outspoken Against the Order’s Effect On 
Its Enforcement Authority 
The FTC has expressed discontent that reclassification of 
broadband Internet access service providers as Title II common 
carriers exempts those entities from its enforcement reach when 
they engage in common carriage services.126 Indeed, FTC repre-
                                                                                                                            
119 See id. at 336 n.11. 
120 549 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1977). 
121 See id. at 461. 
122 Id. at 454. 
123 See id. 
124 See id. at 455–58 (noting that “[t]he regulatory approach articulated by the [FTC], 
while it may be a desirable one, is not the one Congress appears to have adopted”). 
125 See id. at 459 (“Congress’ recognition of a regulatory gap with respect to banks is 
implicitly a recognition of such a gap with respect to common carriers as well.”). 
126 Although section 5 exempts enforcement against “common carrier” activities, this 
exemption does not apply to common carriers’ provision of other, non-common carriage 
services. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 44, 45(a)(2) (2006); see also FTC v. Verity Int’l, Ltd., 443 F.3d 
48, 58–60 & n.4 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing, inter alia, Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 19 F.3d 1475, 
1481 (D.C. Cir. 1994) and Nat’l Ass’n of Reg. Util. Comm’rs v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 608 
(D.C. Cir. 1976)). 
248 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.[Vol. XXVI:225 
 
sentatives have been publicly outspoken against this result. In the 
press, FTC Commissioner Maureen Ohlhaussen has made reclassi-
fication’s effect clear: “If an entity is a common carrier providing 
common carrier services, [the FTC] can’t bring actions against 
them.”127 Other officials have been more harsh. In a statement be-
fore the House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary 
titled Wrecking the Internet to Save It? The FCC’s Net Neutrality 
Rule, FTC Commissioner Joshua D. Wright cites the FTC’s “ex-
pertise” and “vigor[ ]” in protecting privacy to argue that reclassi-
fication results in “obstacles to protecting consumers . . . by de-
priving the FTC of its long-standing jurisdiction in [the] area” and 
“threaten[s] the robust consumer protection efforts that the agen-
cy has engaged in over the last two decades.”128 Jessica Rich, direc-
tor of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection, laments that the 
FCC’s decision “takes an experienced cop off the beat in this im-
portant area.”129 
Despite the FTC’s opinion to the contrary, some advocates for 
reclassification view the FCC’s newly broadened oversight of In-
ternet service providers as a win for consumers.130 These propo-
nents posit that the FCC’s enforcement approach will benefit con-
sumers more than the FTC’s approach does.131 Though the FTC 
issues guidance and other notices to inform consumers and indus-
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Rules for Internet Service Providers, WASH. POST (Feb. 27, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2015/02/27/the-fccs-net-
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try about which practices might trigger enforcement, the agency’s 
enforcement is mostly reactive: that is, it often must wait for a 
company to engage in a practice that the agency considers unfair or 
deceptive before initiating investigatory or enforcement action.132 
In the privacy context, this usually involves holding companies to 
their own broadly defined privacy policies and punishing compa-
nies for policy breaches that may occur.133 
The FCC, on the other hand, has broad rule-making authority 
that empowers the agency to “set standards that companies will 
have to abide by before the troubling practices have even taken 
place.”134 According to Harold Feld, Senior Vice President of Pub-
lic Knowledge, “[t]he FCC’s privacy regulations have worked very 
well, which is why so many people are unaware of them—because 
they are so rigid about enforcing them, people don’t even have to 
think about it.”135 So far, the agency has proven to be an aggressive 
enforcer of current privacy rules as they apply telephone provid-
ers.136 By using its leverage, it is argued, the FCC might be able to 
take control over some controversial online practices—such as the 
use of “supercookies”137—more effectively than could the FTC.138 
Proponents also note that despite reclassification, the FTC is 
not completely barred from regulating online privacy, as the net 
neutrality rules not foreclose the FTC’s ability to police trouble-
some privacy practices committed by non-common carrier Internet 
services and websites.139 Just as the FTC can investigate and bring 
enforcement actions against telemarketers (even though they 
                                                                                                                            
132 See supra Part I.A. 
133 See generally Solove & Hartzog, supra note 28; see also Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy 
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communicate using phone lines), the FTC will also be able to in-
vestigate and bring enforcement actions against Internet services, 
rather than the carriers of those services.140 Indeed, actions against 
services rather than carriers themselves make up the bulk of the 
FTC’s online enforcement to date.141 
3. What Explains the Interagency Tension Here? 
Given the FTC’s still-prominent privacy enforcement role 
even after reclassification, it is somewhat curious that the agency 
has expressed such discontent at its having a broad swath of com-
panies removed from its enforcement scope. Why is the FTC so 
sensitive about having its privacy jurisdiction limited in this way? 
FTC Commissioner Ohlhaussen has cited consumer protec-
tionism as the primary reason for the FTC’s unease with reclassifi-
cation.142 She publicly noted that her concern “is really not so 
much for the FTC, but for the loss to consumers—that they would 
lose out from having the FTC’s active oversight.”143 
In a recent Forbes article, former FCC Wireless Bureau Chief 
Fred Campbell expounds on what such “loss” might entail.144 He 
bases his analysis on the recent merger between Verizon and 
AOL.145 Through this merger, Verizon hopes to harness AOL’s 
targeted advertising capabilities so that Verizon can expand into 
the advertising market as the mobile market slows.146 While the 
                                                                                                                            
140 See id. (“The FCC will oversee the pipes, while the FTC will be able to wield their 
enforcement tools against those who operate services that use the pipes.”). 
141 See Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Privacy Enforcement Actions, FORDHAM CTR. ON LAW 
INFO. POL’Y (June 24, 2014), www.law.fordham.edu/assets/CLIP/CLIP_Privacy_Case_ 
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142 See Fung, supra note 127. 
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144 See generally Fred Campbell, Privacy Concerns About Verizon-AOL Deal Are Really 
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145 See Clarie Groden, Verizon Now Officially Owns AOL, TIME (June 23, 2015), 
http://time.com/3931793/verizon-now-officially-owns-aol/ [http://perma.cc/DX9H-
UV9M]. 
146 See Kevin Fitchard, The Real Reason Verizon Bought AOL, FORTUNE (June 24, 2015), 
http://fortune.com/2015/06/24/verizon-gains-aol/ [http://perma.cc/S53S-RLHR] 
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deal is generally viewed as raising no novel privacy issues, some 
groups oppose it on the basis that the new entity’s power to deliver 
targeted advertising, as well as the substantial data collection that 
will be required to do so, seriously endangers consumer privacy.147 
This, according to the deal’s opponents, should oblige the FCC to 
“move quickly” to impose strong privacy requirements for broad-
band Internet access service providers.148 
However, Campbell argues that opponents’ urging that the 
FCC “interfere[ ]” in Internet privacy amounts to a tactic to help 
edge providers such as Google and Facebook stave off competition 
in the advertising market: 
Verizon’s [purchase of] AOL for $4.4 billion should 
be no big deal for regulators. The [FCC] already an-
nounced that it won’t review the deal and there is 
no reason to think antitrust regulators will raise 
concerns. But that hasn’t stopped Silicon Valley’s 
advertising giants from attempting to leverage the 
deal into new regulations that would help them tigh-
ten their grip on Internet advertising markets. It’s 
understandable that Internet advertising’s market 
leaders are worried about the deal’s potential to in-
crease competition for lucrative ad dollars in mobile 
and over-the-top markets. Google and Facebook 
dominate mobile advertising and would undoubted-
ly like to keep it that way. Though they have little to 
fear from AOL today, a Verizon-AOL combo would 
be a credible competitive threat to their monopolis-
tic ambitions. That’s why their friends in Washing-
ton want the FCC to start interfering in Internet 
                                                                                                                            
(“From Verizon’s standpoint, it needs to find something it can sell via its available 
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147 See Shiva Stella, Public Knowledge Urges FCC to Issue NPRM to Protect Consumer 
Privacy, PUB. KNOWLEDGE (May 12, 2015), https://www.publicknowledge.org/press-
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privacy issues. [The FCC enforcing] new rules pro-
hibiting Internet service providers from tracking 
consumers online would keep Verizon out of their 
markets and could have the effect of killing the deal 
even if antitrust regulators approve it.149 
Campbell raises a few arguments to support his position. First, 
he echoes the idea that the Verizon-AOL merger does not raise any 
novel privacy issues, as Google and Facebook already derive sub-
stantial benefit—tens of millions of dollars per year—from targeted 
advertising empowered by data collection.150 Moreover, the groups 
opposing the merger “don’t seem to care” about Google and Fa-
cebook’s data collection practices: they asked the FCC to regulate 
only Verizon and other ISPs, and not Google or Facebook.151 
Second, he argues that if opponents were genuinely concerned 
with consumer privacy, they would have appealed to the FTC in-
stead of the FCC, as the former’s enforcement history is much 
more substantial than the latter’s.152 For example, while the FTC 
fined Google $22.5 million for misrepresenting its use of cookies in 
August 2012,153 the FCC in that same year fined Google a mere 
$25,000 for its unauthorized collection of highly sensitive consum-
er Wi-Fi data in relation to its Street View project—even though 
Google was determined to have had “deliberately impeded and de-
layed” the FCC’s investigation.154 
Third, Campbell argues that the structure of the net neutrality 
rules is designed to have a competition-inhibiting effect.155 Though 
the FCC could have adopted net neutrality rules that would not 
                                                                                                                            
149 Id.; see also Fitchard, supra note 146. 
150 See Campbell, supra note 144. 
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have encroached upon the FTC’s privacy jurisdiction over Internet 
service providers, the FCC instead opted to apply “an outdated 
privacy statute designed for telephone services” that excludes the 
FTC from governing them.156 Campbell asserts that “[n]o one 
should be surprised that Google and Facebook are now attempting 
to entrench their dominance over Internet advertising by arbitrag-
ing this new jurisdictional split over online privacy,” and that 
“[t]he jurisdictional split created by the net neutrality order 
enables . . . discriminatory result while maintaining a false veneer of 
consumer protection.”157 
Campbell’s theory is subject to criticism. Though he suggests 
that some edge providers such as Google and Facebook are bedfel-
lows with the FCC, the agency might yet regulate those providers. 
Professor Daniel Deacon argues that Communications Act section 
706, as interpreted by courts, gives the FCC a potentially broad 
power to regulate services that fall without its core jurisdiction over 
common carriers.158 
Section 706(a) of the Communications Act directs the FCC to: 
[E]ncourage the deployment on a reasonable and 
timely basis of advanced telecommunications capa-
bility to all Americans . . . by utilizing, in a manner 
consistent with the public interest, convenience, 
and necessity, price cap regulation, regulatory for-
bearance, measures that promote competition in the 
local telecommunications market, or other regulat-
ing methods that remove barriers to infrastructure 
investment.159 
Similarly, section 706(b) requires the FCC to conduct an an-
nual inquiry “concerning the availability of advanced telecommu-
nications capability to all Americans,” and, if it finds that such 
availability is lacking, to “take immediate action to accelerate dep-
loyment of such capability by removing barriers to infrastructure 
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254 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.[Vol. XXVI:225 
 
investment and by promoting competition in the telecommunica-
tions market.”160 
The FCC relied on section 706—a non-Title II basis—as justi-
fication for the no-blocking and nondiscrimination net neutrality 
rules it proposed in its 2010 Open Internet Order.161 There, the 
FCC explained that the rules in that Order promoted the policies 
outlined in section 706 because they supported “virtuous cycle of 
innovation.”162 Upon a challenge to this Order, the D.C. Circuit 
determined that the FCC’s conclusion that section 706(a) “consti-
tutes an affirmative grant of regulatory authority” was a reasonable 
one.163 Additionally, the court upheld the FCC’s determination 
that section 706(b) “empower[ed] it to take steps to accelerate 
broadband deployment if and when it determines that such dep-
loyment is not reasonable and timely.”164 And both sections, the 
court concluded, authorize the FCC to directly regulate broadband 
providers (instead of merely to promote infrastructure deployment 
via other means).165 Although it agreed with the FCC’s jurisdic-
tional arguments, the D.C. Circuit in the end vacated the Order’s 
no-blocking and nondiscrimination rules.166 Nevertheless, the 
court’s decision is significant to the extent that it affirmed the 
FCC’s section 706 authority to regulate companies—namely, 
broadband Internet access providers—that were the same as, or 
closely allied with, those telephone and cable operators the FCC 
has traditionally regulated.167 
According to Professor Deacon, this decision contributes to the 
FCC having “a malleable and potentially broad jurisdiction over 
Internet Protocol-based networks and services.”168 He notes that 
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“there is nothing inherent in the nature of [section] 706 that would 
limit the reach of that section to those particular providers.”169 
Consequently, Deacon argues, the FCC could cite the section’s 
potentially expansive authority to regulate entities that fall outside 
the FCC’s traditional jurisdictional bounds.170 To exemplify his 
theory, Professor Deacon builds a hypothetical involving Google 
and Facebook that could be read as a direct response to former 
Wireless Bureau Chief Campbell’s argument: 
Take, as the most prominent example, edge provid-
ers such as Google or Facebook. The Open Internet 
Order regulated broadband Internet access provid-
ers in order to promote innovation by edge provid-
ers. But there is no reason that FCC could not use 
its [section] 706 power instead to regulate edge pro-
viders directly, at least as long as it could tell a cred-
ible story regarding why such regulation enabled in-
novation at the edge (in turn spurring consumer 
demand for broadband and, with it, broadband in-
frastructure deployment, under the “virtuous 
cycle” theory).171 
Professor Deacon further argues that such a prospect is “not 
fanciful.”172 He considers a case from 2012 in which the FTC in-
vestigated Google over allegations that the company manipulated 
search results to favor its own services.173 Professor Deacon ex-
plains that the issue in that case was “conceptually similar” to is-
sues in the net neutrality dispute, and that in such cases, the FCC 
may find intervention to be appropriate.174 
Given Professor Deacon’s argument, it may be difficult to ra-
tionalize Mr. Campbell’s theory that reclassification and strong 
privacy rules for broadband Internet providers suggest an attempt 
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to promote anticompetitive behavior, and that this has stirred the 
FTC’s ire. Though Deacon’s argument does not necessarily defeat 
Campbell’s, it posits a theory that potentially weakens it. If any-
thing, the combination of theories raises more questions than it 
does provide answers about the true reasons for the FTC’s discon-
tent with the FCC’s decision making. But whether or not we have a 
full explanation, a tension remains between the two agencies. How 
might it be resolved? 
IV. POSSIBILITIES FOR RESOLVING THE INTERAGENCY 
TENSION 
Despite differences between the agencies, the possibility for a 
robust and effective Internet privacy enforcement regime persists. 
For example, new privacy rules for broadband Internet service pro-
viders might delineate enforcement responsibilities between the 
FCC and the FTC, while clarifying industry’s obligations and con-
sumers’ expectations under the new enforcement regime. Alterna-
tively, congressional action could remove the statutory bar that 
prohibits the FTC from enforcing against common carriers. Alter-
natively, or in addition to a repeal of the common carrier exception, 
the FCC and FTC could share cooperative privacy enforcement 
authority, as they share authority in other non-privacy areas. In this 
Part, I explore these possibilities. 
A. New Rules 
New CPNI rules, as devised through rulemaking proceeding, 
will clarify how section 222 applies to broadband Internet access 
service provider. Unlike the Order, these rules could address and 
suggest a remedy for the FCC’s capture of the FTC’s authority to 
police providers’ privacy practices. 
The FCC states in its Order that rulemaking proceedings to 
this end will take place, but it leaves unclear when such proceed-
ings might occur, or when the rules they produce might take ef-
fect.175 However, in a late June 2015 speech, FCC Chairman Tom 
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Wheeler confirmed that the agency would commence privacy 
rulemaking in the fall of that year.176 
In April 28, 2015, the FCC hosted a public workshop on con-
sumer broadband privacy that could potentially provide a preview 
of how Internet-specific rules might appear.177 The FCC’s purpos-
es for hosting the event were to “explore the [FCC’s] role in pro-
tecting the privacy of consumers that use broadband Internet 
access service,” “provide an opportunity for diverse stakeholders 
to explore a range of matters associated with the application of sta-
tutory privacy protections to broadband Internet access service,” 
and “address whether and to what extent the [FCC] can apply a 
harmonized privacy framework across various services within [its] 
jurisdiction.”178 
Members of the workshop’s second panel discussed section 
222’s application to broadband Internet access services.179 Panel-
ists agreed that this application is complicated;180 some panelists 
debated about the extent to which section 222 is suitable to ac-
commodate a privacy framework for Internet service providers, as 
well as the extent to which it is appropriate for the FCC to impose 
an obligation to protect “proprietary information” in the Internet 
context.181 Similarly, the panelists grappled with how to best define 
“customer proprietary network information” in that context.182 
One panelist argued that anti-fraud, cybersecurity, and re-
search-enabling principles should guide the FCC’s revised applica-
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tion of section 222.183 Another panelist argued that the FCC should 
mimic the FTC’s approach and issue guidance documents and 
hold workshops that provide standards and encourage strong pri-
vacy practices so that industry can keep step with a rapidly evolv-
ing landscape.184 Some panelists similarly argued that the FCC 
should adopt an FTC-like set of criteria so one set of rules fulfills 
both consumer and industry expectations.185 
Later, in a May 2015 web conference organized by the Interna-
tional Association of Privacy Professionals, FCC Wireline Compe-
tition Bureau Deputy Chief Matthew DelNero stated that the 
agency is looking to gather “creative” input from stakeholders 
about how to best integrate its broadened privacy authority within 
existing enforcement regimes.186 DelNero stressed that the agency 
is “really very much in an information-gathering mode and [is] re-
ally trying to hear from all the different stakeholders about what the 
important areas are.”187 He noted that though “[t]he [April] work-
shop was a good start, [the agency’s] doors are very much open, 
and [the FCC] hope[s] that the workshop gets people thinking 
good and creative thoughts about where [it] go[es] from here.”188 
According to DelNero, FCC Commissioner Tom Wheeler and 
his colleagues have taken care to point out that the April workshop 
was only the “beginning of a process,” and that the FCC intends to 
take a “careful and deliberative approach” toward privacy.189 As 
part of this approach, the FCC will likely implement further infor-
mal steps for hearing stakeholder input before official rulemaking 
begins.190 
During the web conference, DelNero noted that some stake-
holders have expressed a preference for rules that create a harmo-
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nized enforcement approach.191 For example, fellow panelist Deb-
bie Matties, Vice President of iPrivacy CTIA, argued that the FCC 
must find a way to regulate privacy in a manner that does not in-
trude upon existing regulations or active regulators, including the 
FTC.192 This, DelNero concludes, suggests that “maybe broad-
band providers are less concerned with uncertainty per se and more 
concerned that when [the FCC] does rulemaking, it keeps in mind 
the broader ecosystem and how [s]ection 222 interacts with other 
statutory authorities.”193 
Though new rules would likely clarify industry’s privacy obli-
gations and give consumers a clear framework for their privacy ex-
pectations with respect to how broadband providers handle their 
information, it is yet unclear whether or how such rules might re-
spond to FTC and stakeholders’ concerns about privacy enforce-
ment. Though DelNero’s statements suggest that the FCC may 
consider these concerns during its rulemaking process, it is unclear 
whether such is likely to occur. If rulemaking fails to supply a reso-
lution, means other than formal rulemaking might be more effec-
tive for loosening the interagency tension. 
B. Repeal of the Common Carrier Exception 
As an alternative to, or as an addition to new CPNI rules, Con-
gress might repeal the common carrier exception to eliminate the 
bar that keeps the FTC from regulating common carriers. Some 
stakeholders have called on Congress to do just that.194 According 
to FTC Chairwoman Edith Ramirez, the common carrier excep-
tion is “outdated” and unnecessarily shackles the FTC’s ability to 
protect consumers.195 
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Recently, officials from both agencies have endorsed the idea of 
eliminating the common carrier exception.196 In a March 2015 
House Judiciary Committee hearing, FCC Chairman Tom Whee-
ler said that “[the] idea is definitely worthy of review,” and that 
“[the FCC] should work in tandem with the FTC.”197 He further 
noted that the partnership would amount to “a great one-two 
punch.”198 FTC Commissioner Terrell McSweeny echoed this 
sentiment, arguing that because “[t]here are slightly different tools 
in the FCC toolbox and in the FTC toolbox,” she supports re-
peal.199 
If the common carrier exception is successfully repealed, the 
agencies would have wider authority to police consumer harms, as 
the resulting legal landscape would empower both the FTC and the 
FCC to regulate common carriers whose activities warrant investi-
gation and enforcement. A repeal of the common carrier exception 
would likely lead to greater cooperation between the two agen-
cies.200 
C. Co-Governance 
In 2003, Professor Christopher Yoo wrote that “technological 
convergence” would require a farewell bid to the days in which va-
rying communications services in use could “occupy[ ] a separate 
regulatory silo.”201 He suggested that “the ultimate destiny . . . 
that the various communications platforms will serve as comple-
ments, rather than substitutes . . . raises the possibility that new 
types of regulation that would allow the sharing of each network 
might have to be created.”202 
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In modern times, this “new type of regulation” may be co-
governance. Co-governance regulatory regimes already in place 
suggest that the FCC and FTC might adopt a similar regime for 
online privacy governance. As it stands, each agency participates in 
co-governance schemes already, both with other agencies and with 
each other. 
1. FTC and FCC Co-Governance with Other Agencies 
Both the FTC and the FCC already engage in complementary 
co-governance schemes with other government agencies. For ex-
ample, the FTC along with the Food and Drug Administration 
(“FDA”) and U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) regu-
late food labeling. Similarly, both the FTC and the FCC join forces 
with the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to enforce against 
anticompetitive behavior by reviewing mergers and acquisitions. 
a) Food Labeling (FTC/FDA/USDA) 
The FTC, FDA, and USDA share jurisdiction over claims that 
food manufacturers make about their products pursuant to a com-
plementary statutory scheme. In this context, the FTC relies on 
section 5 of the FTC Act to police “unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices” and sections 12 and 15 of the Act prohibit “any false ad-
vertisement” that is “misleading in a material respect.”203 Similar-
ly, the FDA derives its authority in this context from the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act section 403(a), which prohibits 
“labeling [that] is false or misleading in any particular.”204 The 
USDA authority stems from the Federal Meat Inspection Act, 
which prohibits labeling of meat or meat products that is “false or 
misleading in any particular,”205 and the Poultry Products Inspec-
tion Act, which prohibits labeling of poultry products that is “false 
or misleading in any particular.”206 
                                                                                                                            
203 15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 52, 55 (1980). 
204 21 U.S.C. § 343(a) (2010). 
205 Id. § 601(n)(1) (2015). 
206 Id. § 453(h)(1). 
262 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.[Vol. XXVI:225 
 
Since 1954, the FTC and the FDA have cooperated under a 
Memorandum of Understanding.207 Under this agreement, the 
FTC regulates food advertising, while the FDA regulates food 
labeling.208 In addition, the agreement affirms the agencies’ shared 
commitment to: (1) prevent public deception; (2) coordinate their 
work to eliminate duplicative effort; and (3) promote consistency 
in handling matters of mutual concern.209 
b) Anticompetitive Behavior (FTC/DOJ) 
Both the FTC and the DOJ Antitrust Division enforce federal 
antitrust laws.210 While they share some overlapping jurisdiction, in 
practice the two agencies’ efforts complement one another by rely-
ing on their expertise in different markets.211 For example, the FTC 
often regulates in economic spaces that involve high consumer 
spending, such as health care, pharmaceuticals, professional ser-
vices, food, energy, and technology.212 Before either agency begins 
an investigation, it consults with the other to avoid duplicative en-
forcement of the same transaction; this way, each agency may con-
serve staff resources and avoid placing the same party in a form of 
double jeopardy.213 
                                                                                                                            
207 See Working Agreement Between FTC and Food and Drug Administration, 4 Trade 
Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 9,850.01 (1971). 
208 See id. 
209 See id. ¶¶ 9,850.01–.02. 
210 See The Enforcers, FTC (June 26, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/ 
competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/enforcers [https://perma.cc/HBY8-PB9J] 
[hereinafter The Enforcers]. 
211 Id.; see also Mission, DEP’T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/atr/about/mission.html 
[http://perma.cc/9HQE-6VVP] (last updated July 20, 2015). Under the FTC/DOJ Hart-
Scott-Rodino Premerger Program, FTC and DOJ merger review is formalized: this 
“clearance process” gives the agencies a nine-day window to decide which, based on its 
expertise, will review a particular merger. See James R. Weiss & Martin L. Stern, Serving 
Two Masters: Dual Jurisdiction of the FCC and the Justice Department Over 
Telecommunications Transactions, 6 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 195, 209 (1998). 
212 See The Enforcers, supra note 210. 
213 See id.; see also Harold Furchtgott-Roth, The Failure of FCC Merger Reviews: 
Communications Law Does Not Necessarily Perform Better than Antitrust Law, AMERICAN 
ENTERPRISE INST. (Dec. 9, 2002), http://www.aei.org/publication/the-failure-of-fcc-
merger-reviews/print/ [http://perma.cc/2A4H-7YEW]. 
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The initiation point for the federal antitrust review process for 
mergers is the Hart-Scott-Rodino filing.214 The Hart-Scott-Rodino 
Antitrust Improvements Act provides that parties may not com-
plete certain mergers, acquisitions, or types of asset transfers until 
they have made a detailed filing with the FTC and DOJ, and have 
waited for those agencies to determine that the proposed transac-
tion does not violate antitrust law.215 After a preliminary review of 
filed materials, antitrust regulators may make a “second request” 
for additional information.216 Based on precedent, antitrust lawyers 
can predict when a second request will be made in relation to a par-
ticular transaction.217 Consequently, the Hart-Scott-Rodino proce-
dure is considered to be “clear, predictable, [and] lawful . . . .”218 
If antitrust authorities deem that a proposed merger presents 
anticompetitive problems, the authorities have power to challenge 
the merger in federal court.219 However, actual court challenges are 
“extremely rare,” as parties whose proposed mergers face anti-
competitive problems often modify or withdraw altogether their 
proposals.220 This tidy process eliminates the need for “redun-
dant” federal merger review.221 
Over the years, the FTC and DOJ agencies have developed and 
published multiple revisions of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 
which describe the analytical framework the agencies follow when 
reviewing horizontal mergers.222 The Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 
                                                                                                                            
214 Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2000). 
215 See id. § 18a(a)–(b). 
216 See id. § 18a(e). 
217 See Furchtgott-Roth, supra note 213. 
218 See id. 
219 See 15 U.S.C. § 18a(f). 
220 See Furchtgott-Roth, supra note 213. 
221 See id. 
222 See DEP’T JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (2010), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2010/08/19/hmg-2010.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/MPX4-WB85] [hereinafter 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines]. The 
2010 guidelines replace those issued in 1992 and 1997, as they “reflect the ongoing 
accumulation of experience at the Agencies.” Id. at 1 n.1; see also DEP’T JUST. & FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (1992, rev. 1997), 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.pdf [http://perma.cc/7Z6A-CCJ6]. 
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revised in 2010, “are the product of an extensive team effort” be-
tween the agencies.223 As Carl Shapiro224 describes: 
The process for revising the Guidelines was lengthy, 
collaborative, and open: the [a]gencies posted a se-
ries of questions, inviting public comment on possi-
ble revisions; numerous useful public comments 
were received and reviewed; the [a]gencies spon-
sored five public workshops at which panelists dis-
cussed possible revisions to the Guidelines; subse-
quently, the FTC made public a draft of the pro-
posed Guidelines, again inviting additional public 
comments; numerous thoughtful comments were 
again received and reviewed; and in response to 
those comments, the proposed Guidelines were fur-
ther clarified.225 
Additionally, the agencies collaborated to produce a Commen-
tary on the Horizontal Merger Guidelines.226 In that document, the 
agencies provide specific examples of how they have applied the 
Guidelines’ analytic principles in previously reviewed mergers.227 
c) Anticompetitive Behavior (FCC/DOJ) 
Though the FTC generally has authority to review mergers and 
acquisitions under sections 1 and 6 of the FTC Act,228 the Clayton 
Act strips the FTC of its jurisdiction to review mergers and acqui-
sitions between common carriers (in accordance with the common 
                                                                                                                            
223 Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox in Forty 
Years, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 701, 701 (2010). 
224 Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Economics, Antitrust Division, U.S. 
Department of Justice, on leave from his position as Transamerica Professor of Business 
Strategy, Haas School of Business, University of California at Berkeley. See id. at 701 n.1. 
Shapiro was also a member of the joint DOJ/FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines working 
group. See id. 
225 Id. at 701–02. 
226 See DEP’T JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, Commentary on the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines (2006), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2006/04/27/ 
215247.pdf [http://perma.cc/6K7U-GT4D] [hereinafter Commentary]. Though it 
predates the 2010 guidelines, the Commentary “remains a valuable supplement” to 
them. See 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 222, at 1 n.1. 
227 See generally Commentary, supra note 226. 
228 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 41, 46 (1994). 
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carrier exception) and vests that authority in the FCC instead.229 
Just as other types of mergers require approval by the FTC and the 
DOJ, telecommunications mergers require approval from both the 
FCC and the DOJ.230 
Under this co-governance scheme, the agencies’ statutory 
mandates differ.231 Per section 7 of the Clayton Act, the DOJ may 
prohibit any acquisition that would “substantially . . . lessen com-
petition, or . . . tend to create a monopoly.”232 The Hart-Scot-
Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976233 provides for a mer-
ger preclearance process that ensures timely DOJ review of any 
proposed merger.234 A DOJ challenge to a proposed merger re-
quires that the DOJ bear the burden of proof that the proposed 
merger violates antitrust laws.235 As William J. Rinner notes, this is 
a “crucial” procedural posture, as DOJ-reviewed mergers are 
“presumed not to substantially lessen competition absent a con-
trary showing.”236 As a result, the DOJ’s merger analyses lead to 
predictable standards on which companies can rely.237 
The FCC, on the other hand, reviews mergers according to a 
broad “public interest” standard for license transfers, as articu-
lated in the Communications Act sections 214 and 310.238 Under 
                                                                                                                            
229 See id. § 21(a). 
230 Rachel E. Barkow & Peter W. Huber, A Tale of Two Agencies: A Comparative Analysis 
of FCC and DOJ Review of Telecommunications Mergers, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 29, 29 
(2000). 
231 Compare 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000) with 47 U.S.C. § 214 (1997), and 47 U.S.C. § 310 
(1996). 
232 See 15 U.S.C. § 18; Barkow & Huber, supra note 230, at 37. 
233 15 U.S.C. § 18a. 
234 See generally id. § 18. 
235 See id.; Barkow & Huber, supra note 230, at 37; see also United States v. Citizens & S. 
Nat’l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 120 (1975). 
236 William J. Rinner, Optimizing Dual Agency Review of Telecommunications Mergers, 118 
YALE L.J. 1571, 1573–74 (2009). 
237 See id. at 1574; see also supra Part IV.C.1.b. 
238 See 47 U.S.C. § 214 (1997); 47 U.S.C. § 310 (1996). Under this standard, the FCC 
determines whether the proposed transaction works to promote “the public interest, 
convenience and necessity.” 47 U.S.C. § 310(d); see also Weiss & Stern, supra note 211, at 
197–98. The FCC has no specific statutory authority to review mergers except that under 
Clayton Act section 7, which is reserved for communications carriers and which the FCC 
has never used. See Furchtgott-Roth, supra note 213. 
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this “amorphous”239 standard, the parties must affirmatively prove 
that the proposed transaction would serve the public interest, or 
alternatively, that “any likely anticompetitive effect is more than 
offset by other benefits.”240 Though the FCC views itself as a 
“shadow DOJ” that analyzes mergers to determine how they will 
influence telecommunications industry competition, the two agen-
cies’ approaches are, in reality, “markedly different.”241 
FCC merger review follows similarly the informal adjudication 
model the agency uses to review new license applications.242 But in 
other aspects, it retains some elements of rulemaking.243 Unlike the 
DOJ, the FCC faces no statutory deadline for completing its re-
view.244 The FCC rarely follows a self-imposed 180-day review 
deadline,245 which leads to “long delays that risk undermining the 
very reasons for a merger.”246 
Before it approves a merger, the FCC may request conces-
sions—conditions the merging parties must meet to win approv-
al.247 In cases where the FCC does this, the merging parties must 
either negotiate the conditions requested by the FCC or otherwise 
risk participation in a rare formal adjudicatory hearing, the pros-
pective costs of which are “sufficiently high to deter any proposed 
                                                                                                                            
239 Lawrence M. Frankel, The Flawed Institutional Design of U.S. Merger Review: Stacking 
the Deck Against Enforcement, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 159, 201 n.42 (2008). 
240 See id. at 201. 
241 Barkow & Huber, supra note 230. 
242 See Weiss & Stern, supra note 211, at 197 n.23 (“Section 308 of the Communications 
Act . . . requires the [FCC] to consider the same factors in reviewing a license transfer as 
in granting a license in the first place.”); see also Rinner, supra note 236, at 1574. 
243 For example, parties who seek to transfer a license through a merger often must 
submit supporting materials; other stakeholders may submit remarks through a notice-
and-comment process, and the FCC may request additional documentation. See In re 
Applications of Ameritech Corp., Transferor, and SBC Commc’n, Transferee, 
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. 14712, paras. 47–49 (1999). 
244 See id. paras. 39–45 (describing the FCC’s review process). 
245 See Informal Timeline for Consideration of Applications for Transfers or Assignments of 
Licenses or Authorizations Relating to Complex Mergers, FCC (July 10, 2015), 
http://www.fcc.gov/transaction/timeline.html [https://perma.cc/RCR9-XB4F]; see also 
Barkow & Huber, supra note 230, at 31–32 (“The average merger takes two to four 
months to conclude. Telecommunications mergers, however, take between nine and 
twelve months to conclude.”). 
246 See Barkow & Huber, supra note 230, at 33. 
247 See id. at 64. 
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merger.”248 Through these negotiations, which are guided by the 
overseeing commissioners’ sense of whether pro-competitive fac-
tors and benefits to the public interest outweigh any perceived 
costs that the merger might impose, the FCC molds the transaction 
into a form that meets its approval.249 Agreement to the FCC’s 
conditions often results in merging parties’ sacrificing most ave-
nues for judicial review of the merger’s final approval order.250 
To determine the range and scope of any conditions, the FCC 
conducts an antitrust analysis that closely mirrors the steps out-
lined in the DOJ/FTC’s Horizontal Merger Guidelines.251 This anal-
ysis focuses more intensely on the proposed merger’s effect on po-
tentially relevant market participants than does the DOJ’s prospec-
tive competition review.252 
The FCC’s antitrust authority has been widely criticized. The 
FCC/DOJ dual-standard regime for reviewing telecommunications 
mergers, it is argued, is inefficient and unworkable: the process re-
sults in no written rules, precedents, or guidance; it imposes unne-
cessary, difficult-to-calculate costs on merging parties; and it fails 
to yield consistent, predictable results across industry sectors.253 As 
a result, the viability of FCC merger review co-governance faces 
much skepticism.254 
                                                                                                                            
248 Rinner, supra note 236, at 1575. 
249 Id. at 1576. 
250 See id.; Barkow & Huber, supra note 230, at 78. 
251 See Barkow & Huber, supra note 230, at 44–45; Rinner, supra note 236, at 1575; see 
also 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 222. 
252 See Barkow & Huber, supra note 230, at 44–45. 
253 See Furchtgott-Roth, supra note 213 
254 See, e.g., Lawrence M. Frankel, The Flawed Institutional Design of U.S. Merger Review: 
Stacking the Deck Against Enforcement, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 159, 255 (2008); Laura Kaplan, 
One Merger, Two Agencies: Dual Review in the Breakdown of the AT&T/T-Mobile Merger and 
a Proposal for Reform, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1571, 1612 (2012) (“Concurrent FCC and DOJ 
review of telecommunications mergers simply does not make sense.”); Rinner, supra note 
236; Philip J. Weiser, Reexamining the Legacy of Dual Regulation: Reforming Dual Merger 
Review by the DOJ and the FCC, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 167, 198 (2008) (“The current state 
of merger review and merger remedies in the telecommunications industry is a second-
best world where antitrust authorities encroach on the turf of the regulatory authorities 
and vice versa.”); Furchtgott-Roth, supra note 213, at 7 (“The FCC’s review of license 
transfers has made a mockery of the Clayton Act review of mergers and acquisitions by 
the federal antitrust agencies. Merging parties are subjected to various forms of regulatory 
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2. The FCC and FTC Already Co-Govern in Some Areas 
The FCC and FTC share complementary jurisdiction in other 
areas already. The two agencies have successfully cooperated on 
issues involving special telephone services such as “900-numbers” 
and “dial-around” services, as well as in the context of “cram-
ming.” 
a) 900-Numbers 
The FCC and FTC, along with the U.S. Postal Service, share 
jurisdiction over the 900-number telephone services industry.255 
The FCC assigns the 900 area code, which designates that a certain 
type of call is being made rather than designating a call’s geograph-
ic location.256 Consumers can call 900-numbers to purchase infor-
mation or service via phone.257 
In this context, the FCC monitors long-distance carriers who 
provide 900-numbers, and shares jurisdiction with individual states 
over billing and collection services.258 In tandem, the FTC investi-
gates the complaints of consumers who allege that they were over-
charged for 900-number services or did not receive those services 
as advertised.259 U.S. Postal Service inspectors have authority to 
investigate 900-number-related fraud in cases where consumers’ 
use of the services involves mail delivery.260 
b) Dial-around Services 
Another example of FCC and FTC collaboration is the agen-
cies’ Joint FCC/FTC Policy Statement For the Advertising of Dial-
Around and Other Long-Distance Services To Consumers (“Joint Ad-
                                                                                                                            
double jeopardy not faced by merging parties in other industries. Peculiar and potentially 
unlawful results are reached leading to a patchwork quilt of company-specific rules.”). 
255 See Nancy D. Galvez, 900 Numbers: A Controversial Industry, 10 J. CONSUMER EDU. 
1, 3–4 (1992). 
256 See AT&T Commc’ns of Maryland, Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 176 Md. 
App. 22, 25–26 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007), rev’d sub nom. AT&T Commc’ns of 
Maryland, Inc. v. Comptroller of Treasury, 950 A.2d 86, 87 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008). 
257 See id. 
258 See Galvez, supra note 255, at 3–4. 
259 See id. at 4. 
260 Id. 
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vertising Guidelines”).261 To protect consumers from improper 
statements and disclosures contained in certain advertisements for 
dial-around long-distance services, the agencies jointly developed 
the Joint Advertising Guidelines to address which dial-around ad-
vertising approaches are permissible and which are misleading.262 
These services, which include “10-10-XXX” numbers, enable cus-
tomers to bypass, or dial-around their pre-selected long-distance 
service provider for a given telephone to use a different service 
provider.263 The March 1, 2000 Guidelines establish basic prin-
ciples to which dial-around advertisers must adhere, including 
truthfulness, disclosure, clarity, and conspicuousness.264 
Concurrent with the Joint Advertising Guidelines, the FCC 
announced that it fined MCI WorldCom Inc., a dial-around servic-
es company, $100 thousand for making misleading statements 
about its rates in advertisements.265 
c) “Cramming” 
The FTC and FCC join efforts to protect against “cram-
ming”—the term given to the placing of unwanted or more-
frequently-than-expected extra charges to customers’ telephone 
bills.266 Often, cramming results from scammers’ attaching diffi-
cult-to-spot charges to text message services such as text-based ho-
                                                                                                                            
261 See In re Joint FCC/FTC Policy Statement For the Advertising of Dial-Around and 
Other Long-Distance Services To Consumers, Policy Statement, 15 FCC Rcd. 8654, para. 
1 (2000) [hereinafter Joint Advertising Guidelines]; see also Furchtgott-Roth & Tramont, 
supra note 114, at 219–20. 
262 See Joint Advertising Guidelines, supra note 261, para. 10. 
263 See id. para. 3. 
264 See id. paras. 11–14. 
265 See In re MCI WorldCom, Inc., Order, 15 FCC Rcd. 4545 (2000); Peter S. 
Goodman, FCC Fines MCI WorldCom for “Dial-Around” Ads, WASH. POST (March 1, 
2000), http://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/2000/03/01/fcc-fines-mci-
worldcom-for-dial-around-ads/5a97d5e2-9817-45d5-8c7e-d4fe6cdb0897/ 
[http://perma.cc/6T77-4RY4]. 
266 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, MOBILE CRAMMING: AN FTC STAFF REPORT 7, 11 (2014), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/mobile-cramming-federal-trade-
commission-staff-report-july-2014/140728mobilecramming.pdf [https://perma.cc/66TP-
EKVF]; Cramming—Unauthorized Charges on Your Phone Bill, FCC (May 12, 2015), 
https://www.fcc.gov/guides/cramming-unauthorized-misleading-or-deceptive-charges-
placed-your-telephone-bill [http://perma.cc/49MF-H6XS]. 
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roscopes or trivia games.267 Phone service carriers often take a cut 
of these extra fees.268 
In May 2015, Verizon Wireless and Sprint were forced to pay 
$90 million and $68 million, respectively, to settle joint investiga-
tions by the FCC and FTC that revealed that both companies prof-
ited from cramming.269 A similar joint investigation in 2014 re-
sulted in AT&T’s having to pay $105 million to settle cramming 
charges.270 In its statement on the settlement, the FCC cited the 
investigation as “a prime example of government agencies working 
together on behalf of American consumers.”271 
3. Is There Opportunity for FCC/FTC Cooperation in the 
Online Privacy Context? 
Just as the FCC and FTC collaborate and co-govern in the 900-
number and the dial-around service contexts, the two agencies 
might cooperate similarly in the Internet privacy context. In the 
April 28, 2015 Public Workshop on Broadband Consumer Privacy, 
FCC and FTC officials expressed a desire to work together to regu-
late and enforce new rules governing how CPNI data will be col-
lected, shared, used, and stored.272 The FTC expressed a similar 
sentiment in a 2014 Comment to the FCC on Internet deploy-
ment.273 FCC Enforcement Bureau Chief Travis LeBlanc has 
                                                                                                                            
267 See Alex Fitzpatrick, T-Mobile and the FTC: What Is Text Message “Cramming?,” 
TIME (July 2, 2014), http://time.com/2950184/what-is-text-message-cramming/ 
[http://perma.cc/9F3P-3MBZ]. 
268 See id. 
269 See Fed. Comm. Comm’n, Verizon & Sprint to Pay $158 Million to Settle Mobile 
Cramming Investigations, FCC (May 12, 2015), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/ 
attachmatch/DOC-333427A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/GLV7-8JAX]. The Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau and various states’ attorneys general joined in the effort. See 
id. 
270 See Fed. Comm. Comm’n, AT&T Mobility to Pay $105 Million to Settle Wireless 
Cramming and Truth-In-Billing Investigation, FCC (Oct. 8, 2014), https://apps.fcc.gov/ 
edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-329830A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/SQ53-9MTY]. 
271 Id. 
272 See Public Workshop, supra note 85; see also Lydia Beyoud, FCC, FTC Promise to Work 
in Concert on Consumer Privacy Rules in Broadband, BLOOMBERG BNA (Apr. 28, 2015), 
http://www.bna.com/fcc-ftc-promise-n17179925915/ [http://perma.cc/9N22-9JY4]. 
273 See Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications 
Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to 
Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 
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stated that the FCC “has to start to think hard about data” after its 
decision to reclassify broadband Internet service providers as 
common carriers.274 In an August 2015 Wall Street Journal com-
mentary, FTC and FCC commissioners noted that they are “dis-
turbed” that their respective agencies are on a “collision 
course.”275 
Neither the FCC nor the FTC have defined how their coopera-
tion might take shape here. But the FTC’s 2014 comment to the 
FCC may prove instructive: “as the FCC explores the laws and 
standards applicable to broadband providers . . . the FTC encou-
rages the FCC to consider the [agencies’] well-established legal 
standards and best practices,” such as those outlined in the Joint 
Advertising Guidelines.276 A cooperative FTC/FCC privacy en-
forcement regime could mirror the agencies’ approach to dial-
around service enforcement. For example, the agencies could issue 
joint privacy guidance documents, such as those described 
above.277 Additionally, the agencies could develop a set of consis-
tent substantive principles for enforcing privacy jointly.278 Or simi-
                                                                                                                            
1996, as Amended by the Broadband Data Improvement Act, Comment of the FTC, GN 
Docket No. 14–126 at 12 (Sept. 19, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ 
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276 See FTC Comment, supra note 273, at 12. See generally Joint Advertising Guidelines, 
supra note 261. 
277 See supra notes 251–52, 261–64 and accompanying text; see also supra note 184 and 
accompanying text. 
278 See generally Joint Advertising Guidelines, supra note 261 (discussing substantive 
principles that the FTC and FCC apply to false or misleading advertising practices 
considered “deceptive” under section 5 of the FTC Act and “unjust and unreasonable” 
under section 201(b) of the Communications Act). 
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larly, the agencies could carve out expertise-specific areas for pri-
vacy enforcement, such as the FTC and DOJ do in the antitrust 
context.279 
When considering co-governance as a viable option for Internet 
privacy regulation, we should remember the criticisms that the 
FCC’s current co-governance scheme face.280 For FCC/FTC pri-
vacy co-governance to be effective, it is important the regime 
would be free from any of the problems inherent in the 
FCC/DOJ’s antitrust co-governance scheme. That is, a privacy co-
governance regime should produce and rely upon clear, efficient, 
predictable rules and standards. Otherwise, the same inefficiencies 
that plague the FCC/DOJ antitrust co-governance regime would 
render any complimentary privacy governance scheme unworkable 
and ineffective. 
CONCLUSION 
Internet privacy is at a crossroads.281 As consumer privacy and 
data security grow in interest to both consumers and regulators, 
rapid and aggressive changes to regulation in these areas are taking 
place. As businesses, consumers, and regulators adapt to these 
changes, they will inevitably face complications and tensions. Such 
is the way of progress. 
But complications and tensions are less tolerable in some areas 
than in others. Generally speaking, we hope that our government 
functions effectively and efficiently; this is especially true when the 
government’s function is to protect something as sacrosanct as 
personal privacy. 
In this Note, I have attempted to provide an account of one 
tension that has arisen in the Internet privacy context. Though I 
have offered a few potential solutions for resolving this tension, it is 
                                                                                                                            
279 See, e.g., supra Part IV.C.1.b. Indeed, the FTC suggests this in its 2014 Comment. 
See FTC Comment, supra note 273, at 12 n.43 (citing Joint Advertising Guidelines, supra 
note 261, paras. 4–8). 
280 See supra Part IV.C.1.c. 
281 The author tips his hat to Professor Dan Deacon for inspiring this simple summary. 
See Deacon, supra note 82, at 183 (“Communications policy is at a crossroads.”). 
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difficult to predict how resolution will occur—if it occurs at all. It 
will be interesting to wait and see. 
